China’s President Xi Jinping announced in February 2026 that from 1 May China would be granting zero-tariff treatment to 53 African countries. (That is all of them bar Eswatini, which supports Taiwan.)
China-Africa trade reached US$348 billion in 2025, up 17.7% from 2024. Chinese exports to Africa dominate trade flows, and amounted to US$225 billion, an increase of 25.8%. This compares to US$123 billion in imports from Africa, which grew by just 5.4%. Such a rising trade deficit between Africa and its largest sovereign trade partner points to the timeliness of new China policies that support African exports to China.
Beyond potential for trade facilitation and diplomacy, at a time of trade rivalry between the great powers, what might the change mean?
Based on years of study of China-Africa trade relations, I argue that there will be two probable main effects – one positive, one negative.
First, on the positive side, zero tariffs could provide incentives for cross-country export cooperation within Africa. On the negative, it risks creating conditions in which Africa’s stronger economies capture the most gain at the expense of weaker economies.
The existing regime
China’s Africa-specific trade preferences have evolved through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, established in 2000. China’s own global trade integration since its accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 has also evolved.
Since 2005, African least developed countries have enjoyed zero-tariff access to China across 100% of tariff lines. Least developed countries are low-income countries confronting severe structural impediments to sustainable development. They are highly vulnerable to economic and environmental shocks and have low levels of human capital.
This policy restricted zero-tariff trade access to around 33 countries (subject to change owing to income growth and diplomatic recognition of Beijing). Africa’s middle-income exporters were excluded from the trade preferences.
South Africa, for example, continued to face tariffs on most exports, including fruits, wine and processed foods. Many were between 10% and 25%.
A handful of research papers have explored earlier Chinese trade preferences for Africa. For example, policy researcher and economist Adam Minson estimated that the least developed country tariff-free arrangements of 2005 would bring some countries as little as an additional US$100,000 annually.
My own PhD research found that by 2009 these preferential trade policies had not had any significant impact on exports. More recently, economists Zhina Sun and Ehizuelen Michael Mitchell Omoruyi found that the existing zero-tariff policy had promoted diversification of manufacturing exports to China and of regional trade. But there had been little effect on agriculture and mining export diversification.
One recurring recommendation has been to expand equal tariff treatment across African regional blocs. These include the East African Community, Southern African Customs Union and the Economic Community of West African States.
This could lead to production for export being organised regionally rather than distorted or even hampered by tariff differentials.
The reforms announced by Xi in February are a shift in this direction.
An incentive to co-operate?
By extending zero tariffs to almost all African countries, China has neutralised an element of distortion in its earlier tariff policy. When only some countries enjoyed tariff-free export benefits, investors and producers had incentives to locate export production in least developed countries to secure tariff-free access.
This worked some of the time, but not all the time. The reason for this is that least developed countries find it difficult to become exporters because they face inhibiting barriers to trade in general. Examples include unreliable electricity and poor infrastructure.
The zero tariff will put least developed countries at a disadvantage as they will lose the “special status” afforded them in the old regime. But the change could open another door. Production decisions can now take advantage of existing and potential cross-country and intra-regional supply chains based on comparative advantage – in place of being located where export tariffs were smallest.
Also, lowering tariffs for more developed African economies may enable African entrepreneurs to work across borders to engage in trade without facing different trade barriers by locality. That in turn may support Africa’s own agenda of trade integration.
To boost trade, China has also signalled it will expand trade facilitation measures. This includes upgraded “green lanes” for African imports. Prospective examples include:
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faster customs clearance
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streamlined phytosanitary procedures (rules governing food safety). An example would be setting up a clear set of criteria that enable an approved exporter, say of Kenyan avocados, to enjoy pre-approval for customs clearance.
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greater investments in training and trade-related logistics.
China has also set up a dedicated China-Africa trade facilitation hub in Changsha, the capital of Hunan province. The aim is to have a central point of trade-related expertise and industries, making it easier for African and Chinese firms do business.
The risk of uneven gains
There is a risk that the new tariff regime will mean that production for export will concentrate in more developed countries, such as South Africa, Morocco and Kenya. These economies are better positioned to expand exports when it comes into effect.
In contrast, least developed countries will continue to struggle with:
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constructing efficient trade-related infrastructure like telecommunications, electricity and port connectivity
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production at export scale
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reaching trade-related compliance standards such as the necessary fruit sizes and colour consistency.
China’s policy change calls for Africa’s frontier exporters to China to build trade-related supply chains across African borders to garner the scale and competitiveness to expand their own – soon tariff-free – exports to China. In turn, this would reduce the burden on least developed countries to need to export directly to China. Instead, they would only need to join regional trade supply chains.
Ideally within African sub-regions this could develop into a new incentive to create trade-related value chains.
The potential for equalisation
The May Day tariff reforms are a positive in removing formal tariff barriers at a time when tariffs are going up, led by the United States. This change simplifies incentives and eliminates structural asymmetries in China’s Africa trade regime.
Tariffs, however, are seldom the main constraint for African industrial transformation and export hopes. On top of this, uncertainty is complicating the global trade environment.
Nonetheless, these reforms are a step towards fostering sub-regional supply chains if African countries coordinate production strategies.
Lauren Johnston is affiliated with the AustChina Institute and South African Institute of International Affairs.
